Will relaxing ECB regulations lead to more robust NBFCs and better inclusive finance?

Over the past decade or so, NBFCs have increasingly adopted a “growth at all costs” strategy, particularly in newer as well as in relatively riskier credit segments such as microfinance and unsecured MSME lending, EV financing, and rooftop solar financing. These are segments that are still evolving, have limited historical data, and inherently higher execution and credit risks.

A key driver of this behaviour is the funding constraint faced by early-stage and smaller NBFCs. Bank debt is typically unavailable to NBFCs operating at a small scale or with lower credit ratings. As a result, such NBFCs are forced to rely on a narrow set of high-cost NBFC or alternative lenders. This, in turn, pushes them toward credit segments that can absorb higher lending rates, reinforcing concentration in riskier asset classes.

To access lower-cost funding from banks or from development finance institutions, NBFCs generally need to reach a minimum scale of around INR 1,000–1,500 crore in assets or alternatively maintain very low leverage supported by substantial equity (often INR 500 crore or more). Credit rating upgrades, which are critical for funding access, are themselves contingent on achieving this scale or equity depth.

Consequently, NBFCs are incentivised to raise large amounts of equity early in their lifecycle to reach a “fundable” size quickly. However, higher equity raises come with heightened growth expectations. Equity investors require attractive IRRs, which translates into pressure on management to deploy capital rapidly. This creates a structural bias toward rapid balance sheet expansion. This has led to situations where NBFCs publicly articulate aggressive growth targets-such as scaling to INR 500 crore in assets within six months-backed primarily by equity capital.

History shows that such premature scaling has repeatedly resulted in asset quality stress and significant portfolio delinquencies. Look around. In newer credit models and while lending to weaker borrower segments, sustainable outcomes require cautious, measured growth, strong underwriting feedback loops, and time to learn from portfolio behaviour. The current funding environment, however, makes such measured growth difficult: early-stage debt is scarce and expensive, while equity funding implicitly demands speed.

This raises a fundamental question: how can prudent, phased growth be achieved in new and riskier lending segments when access to borrowings is constrained in the early stages and equity capital pushes NBFCs toward premature scale?

Recently proposed draft changes in ECB guidelines – particularly the removal of interest rate caps- could help address this mismatch. These changes may enable a greater inflow of foreign capital with “mezzanine-like” characteristics, sitting between pure equity and senior debt. Such capital can partially substitute for equity, reduce immediate growth pressure, and allow NBFCs to scale more gradually while building robust credit models.

Will the Indian financial services industry now learn to adopt a changed mindset to look at mezzanine as a replacement of equity and not for debt?

The traditional Indian financing hierarchy is still very binary:

  • Equity = permanent capital, growth risk, IRR expectations
  • Debt = fixed obligations, ratings-driven, asset-backed

Mezzanine capital sits uncomfortably in between and is treated as “expensive debt. But in reality, especially for early- to mid-stage NBFCs, mezzanine behaves far more like equity than debt:

  • It absorbs risk before senior lenders
  • It allows time for seasoning of portfolios
  • It reduces pressure for premature balance sheet expansion
  • It aligns better with measured growth in new credit models

Without recognising this, the industry will keep repeating the same boom–bust cycle driven by equity-fuelled hypergrowth.

So, what do you think? Will relaxing ECB regulations lead to more robust NBFCs and better inclusive finance?

Climate finance for India: Connecting the right tracks for capital flow

(This is part 1 of a 3 part series on climate finance for India. Read part 2, 3 here.)

Climate change poses a significant threat to India’s economic growth and development. It is widely accepted that India needs to invest trillions of dollars to prevent severe economic losses due to climate change. Luckily, several investors have committed billions to invest for climate finance in India. 

And yet, the actual amount of capital invested to date is less than the total capital needed. Investors say there are few investable opportunities. But climate projects and organisations, solving climate issues, claim that finance is not available. 

Climate finance is like a poorly managed railway network

The climate finance situation in India is like a poorly managed railway system. Trains arrive but can’t reach their platforms. High-speed trains connecting major cities are prioritised over regional ones that carry far more passengers. Congestion slows everything down, delaying trains and leaving passengers frustrated.

Why are the climate finance trains delayed? 

Currently, climate finance in India, is focussed on large scale solar or wind parks. These types of projects have many years of investment history. Over time, investors have developed well-defined evaluation criteria. The perceived risk is low, and the investors can invest larger amounts per transaction. Electric vehicles and vehicles financing has recently been able to raise significant capital, largely due to policy tailwinds.

However, smaller climate projects, modern technologies and business models, struggle to secure financing. They have limited operating history and no standard evaluation criteria. This makes them harder and more expensive to assess compared to larger projects. Investing in these projects requires risk appetite and patience.

Lack of investor domain expertise and inability to invest time leads to focus on larger investments

Investing in any new area requires a commitment of time and people to build expertise on the relevant sectors and develop sources of deal-flow. Large investors, who deploy billions of dollars with relatively small teams, have to justify such commitments of time and people, especially if it is for sectors or opportunities that do not have a history of raising commercial capital. Often such efforts are found to be wasteful.

Difficult to find common ground for capital sources with different risk- return-impact expectations: 

Philanthropic concessional capital has risk appetite and patience for early and sub-scale projects and technologies, but such form of capital is limited. Commercial investors are not constrained by capital, but they do not have the risk appetite. They may also expect unrealistic financial returns. Concessional capital can promise to absorb the risk and make these opportunities safer to invest for commercial investors. Unfortunately, they do not find common ground to work with each other.

Traditional categorisation of investor types does not suit climate finance: 

Another problem is that investors are normally split into two distinct categories- Venture capital investors providing equity capital and banks providing debt capital. When venture capital investors invest, they expect companies to grow exponentially. When banks finance, they expect hard assets as collateral and years of track record. Significant majority of climate opportunities are not suited for either type of financing. They need something in between. Traditional categorisation of investors leads to climate projects not getting funded.

In summary, the current financial system is like an inefficiently run railway system that prioritizes highspeed express trains and neglects regional routes. It leaves out impactful projects that affects most of the people.

(This is part 1 of a 3 part series on climate finance for India. Read part 2, 3 here.)